Path leading into a forest in the south of Austria.
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Snowy fields near my hometown in Upper Austria.
Untamed meadows and distant mountaintops.
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
Most of my research is best labelled moral psychology, ethics of belief, or epistemology of mind. I also have budding interests in phenomenology and adjacent fields.
Most of my research is best labelled moral psychology, ethics of belief, or epistemology of mind. I also have budding interests in phenomenology and adjacent fields.
My main research agenda at the moment aims to develop a quasi-perceptual character epistemology. That is to say, I am working to vindicate the unorthodox view that one person can be directly aware of another's innermost traits, rather than having to infer them from known behavior, thought, or feeling. On this view, one person's kindness, aloofness, or gullibility can, through intuition, enter another person's consciousness, just like an apple's redness, smoothness, or sweetness does through sensory perception. There are metaphysical obstacles to this idea, but it also promises ethical and epistemological rewards; I strive to overcome the obstacles in order to reap the rewards. Alongside this project, I am also thinking and writing about a cluster of related topics that include (among others) resentment, love, hypocrisy, and forgiveness.
For more detail about my work, see the abstracts below. Where links are absent, please email me to request a draft.
published & forthcoming
“Internal Identity Is (Partly) Dispositional Identity” (Synthese): I highlight the importance of a certain class of mental dispositions—viz., those whose manifestations have phenomenal character—to Twin Earth identity.
“Biozentrismus” (Handbuch Tierethik): Co-authored with Angela Kallhoff, this is an invited contribution to a German-language handbook on animal ethics, wherein we canvass different versions of biocentrism and arguments for and against the view.
“Do You Really Want to Know? Challenging Pragmatism and Clearing Space for the Intrinsic Value View” (Kriterion): I pose a dilemma for certain contemporary defenses of pragmatism about epistemic norms.
under journal review
[title redacted]: A paper on the eternal anger problem in moral psychology.
being drafted
“Friendship, Forensics, and Favoritism”: I defend a quasi-perceptual explanation of the data surrounding epistemic partiality, notably the common intuition that we ought to bend unflattering evidence about our friends and loved ones in their favor.
“On Seeing Someone for Who They Really Are”: I identify the metaphysical preconditions of direct acquaintance with someone else's personality traits and argue that this idea, which promises theoretical pay-offs, is not as mysterious as it sounds.
“Is Moral Judgment Jadelike?”: I use theories of reference to challenge moral judgment pluralism—a novel contender in metaethics, according to which moral judgment is belief-like on some occasions and desire-like on others.
A paper on the use of heuristics and proxies in character judgment.
A paper on the epistemic opportunity costs of gossip.
A paper on the role that ethical expertise plays for our standing to blame.
peer-reviewed presentations
Friendship, Forensics, and Favoritism
Friendship, Forensics, and Favoritism
Wisconsin Philosophical Association, UW-Stevens Point, Apr. 2025
American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Denver (poster presentation), Feb. 2023
72nd Annual Meeting of the New Mexico Texas Philosophical Society, Waco (remote presentation), Apr. 2022
European Epistemology Network Conference, Glasgow (unable to attend), Jun. 2022
Virtuous and Vicious Partiality, Christopher Newport University, Feb. 2022
Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks, UT-Austin, Dec. 2021
72nd Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Portland State University Nov. 2021
Edinburgh Graduate Epistemology Conference, University of Edinburgh (remote presentation), Aug. 2021
Columbia-NYU Graduate Conference, Columbia University and NYU (remote presentation), Mar. 2021
The Reason to Be Angry Proportionally
The Reason to Be Angry Proportionally
Wisconsin Philosophical Association, UW-La Crosse, Apr. 2024
Virtuous and Vicious Responses to Tragedy, Christopher Newport University, Feb. 2024
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Baltimore (poster and remote presentation), Jan. 2022
Understanding Value X, University of Sheffield (remote presentation), Jul. 2021
Munich Graduate Conference in Ethics, Ludwig-Maximilians Universität (remote presentation), Jul. 2021
Braga Meetings on Ethical and Political Philosophy, University of Minho (remote presentation), Jun. 2021
Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks, UT-Austin (remote presentation), Nov. 2020
Workshops in Political Theory, University of Manchester (remote presentation), Sept. 2020
The Metasemantic Challenge for Moral Judgment Pluralism
The Metasemantic Challenge for Moral Judgment Pluralism
11th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Vienna, Aug. 2023
Wisconsin Philosophical Association, Marquette University, Apr. 2023
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Francisco (poster presentation), Apr. 2023
Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Meeting, Apr. 2022
Harvard-MIT Graduate Philosophy Conference (remote presentation), Apr. 2022
NCPS-SCSP Joint Meeting, Converse University, Mar. 2022
Great Lakes Philosophy Conference, Adrian College/Siena Heights University (remote presentation), Apr. 2021
Extended or Embodied? Questioning Conventional Wisdom in Cognitive Science
Extended or Embodied? Questioning Conventional Wisdom in Cognitive Science
Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (poster and remote presentation), Jul. 2021
Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (remote presentation), Jul. 2021
Internal Identity Is (Partly) Dispositional Identity
Internal Identity Is (Partly) Dispositional Identity
American Philosophical Association, Central Division (symposium, remote presentation), Feb. 2021
Mark L. Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference, Brown University, Nov. 2019
Fifth Philosophy of Language and Mind Network Conference, St. Andrews (poster presentation), Aug. 2019
IIFs-UNAM Graduate Philosophy Conference, Mexico City, Mar. 2018
From Expert Deference to Peer Deference
From Expert Deference to Peer Deference
Social (Distance) Epistemology Series (remote presentation), Jul. 2020
Understanding and Ability: A Reply to Sullivan
Understanding and Ability: A Reply to Sullivan
Edinburgh Graduate Epistemology Conference, University of Edinburgh, May 2019
Mind, Language & Action Group Graduate Conference, University of Porto, April 2019
Philosophy in Progress Postgraduate Conference, University of Nottingham, Jan. 2019
Here Is One Normative Truth, and Here Is Another
Here Is One Normative Truth, and Here Is Another
Filosofia Nord Ovest Graduate Conference, University of Pavia, Jun. 2019
Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, University of Salzburg, Sep. 2017
The Myth of the Given Advice
The Myth of the Given Advice
Ways of Knowing in Ethics, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Jun. 2018
Do You Really Want to Know? Challenging Pragmatism and Clearing Space for the Intrinsic Value View
Do You Really Want to Know? Challenging Pragmatism and Clearing Space for the Intrinsic Value View
Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, University of Salzburg, Sep. 2015
皇穹宇 Huangqiongyu (the Imperial Vault of Heaven).
Oxford's Christ Church College at sunset.
The Great Wall at 八达岭 Badaling.
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